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66 
COLLECTIVE RIGHTS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
AFTER CARPENTER 
DAVID GRAY∗ 
In a landmark opinion, the Supreme Court held in Carpenter v. United 
States1 that government acquisition of cell-site location records from a cellu-
lar service provider is a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment re-
quiring a warrant.2  The majority opinion written by Chief Justice John Rob-
erts in support of that holding is not a model of lucidity.  In fact, it seems 
almost deliberately obscure at several critical junctures.  Carpenter is far 
from unique in this regard.  The Court has a long history of mumbling when 
it confronts new challenges or controversial social questions.  Perhaps that is 
as it should be.  Vagueness at the vanguard preserves latitude for the Court 
to construe its own precedents broadly or narrowly in response to subsequent 
events and the facts of particular cases, refining and developing doctrine as 
it goes along.  It is therefore hard to criticize the Justices for preserving the 
possibility of future humility at these moments of maximum hubris.   
And who are we to complain anyway?  This is just the sort of thing that 
keeps law professors well-fed.  The feast has certainly begun on Carpenter 
with critics asking impertinent questions such as “What, precisely, is the gov-
ernment action that constitutes a ‘search’ when law enforcement requests 
business records from a service provider?”3 and “How, exactly, do customers 
have Fourth Amendment ‘standing’ to challenge those requests?”4  This Es-
say will answer both questions.  The key, as we shall see, is that the Court 
finally seems to be taking seriously the text of the Fourth Amendment, which 
guarantees the right of “the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,”5 not, as the 
Court often has assumed, a right of persons or individuals.6  This shift in 
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 1.  138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 2.  Id. at 2223. 
 3.  Professor Danielle Citron and I squarely addressed this question in David Gray & Danielle 
Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 133–37 (2013).   
 4.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2227 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2241–42 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting). 
 5.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 6.  I make the case for a collective rights reading of the Fourth Amendment at length in my 
recent book.  DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 134–89 
(2017). 
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focus is subtle, but critical, both as a matter of fidelity to the text and as a 
way to light the path forward as the Court confronts law enforcement’s use 
of new and emerging surveillance technologies. 
I.  FIRST HINTS: UNITED STATES V. JONES 
The story starts in 2011 during oral argument in United States v. Jones.7  
In that case, law enforcement officers in Washington, D.C., had installed 
GPS-tracking devices on vehicles possessed and operated by Antoine Jones 
and Lawrence Maynard.  Officers suspected that Jones and Maynard were 
involved in a drug distribution conspiracy of significant dimensions.  Agents 
hoped to use the GPS devices to track their suspects’ movements in order to 
find locations associated with the conspiracy and to look for evidence, addi-
tional suspects, and potential witnesses.  The strategy was quite successful.  
By tracking Jones and Maynard for almost a month, investigators found stash 
houses and distribution centers.  Agents were also able to document Jones’s 
and Maynard’s making regular stops at these and other locations associated 
with the conspiracy, providing valuable direct and corroborating evidence of 
their participation. 
Before trial, Maynard and Jones sought to suppress the GPS tracking 
evidence and all the investigative fruits derived from that evidence.8  By their 
lights, the officers’ installation of those devices and their subsequent use of 
the devices to conduct long-term surveillance constituted a “search” for pur-
poses of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore required a warrant.  Interest-
ingly, the investigating officers seemed to have agreed at some point—or at 
least worried at the outset that their conduct might implicate the Fourth 
Amendment.  That is evidenced by the fact that they sought and secured war-
rants to install and use the GPS trackers.  Unfortunately, they failed to abide 
by the terms of those warrants—allowing them to expire and, in the case of 
Jones, installing the device in Maryland, outside the jurisdiction of the court 
that granted the warrant.9 
The trial court in large part denied the motions to suppress.10  The court 
agreed that the officers violated the terms of their warrants.  But, the court 
ruled, those mistakes did not rise to the level of constitutional violations be-
cause the installation and use of GPS trackers was not a “search” for purposes 
of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, no warrant was required in the first 
place.  The warrants were gratuities—nice gestures, but not constitutionally 
                                                        
 7.  565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 8.  Id. at 403. 
 9.  Id. at 402–03. 
 10.  United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 89 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).  The trial court granted the motion only as to the short 
periods of time when Jones’s car was parked in a garage adjoining his residence.  Id. 
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required.  Violating the terms of those warrants was, therefore, of no legal 
consequence.  In reaching this conclusion, the court relied principally on the 
“public observation doctrine.”11  The public observation doctrine holds that 
officers may conduct surveillance from any lawful vantage without encroach-
ing upon Fourth Amendment rights.  The theory promulgated by the Supreme 
Court in support of the public observation doctrine is that when officers con-
duct observations from sidewalks, public roads, or public airspace, they are 
doing no more than a member of the public might do and, therefore, are not 
violating anyone’s reasonable expectations of privacy.12  It follows that these 
kinds of observations from public space are not “searches” for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment.  The trial court’s reliance on the public observation 
doctrine in Jones seemed to be particularly appropriate in light of the Su-
preme Court’s holding in United States v. Knotts.13 
In Knotts, officers used a radio beeper device to track a container of 
chemicals in an effort to find locations associated with a conspiracy to man-
ufacture and distribute methamphetamine.  During their surveillance, officers 
used that device to track a coconspirator while he drove on public roads until 
he stopped, eventually, at a cabin owned by Knotts.  Writing for the Court in 
Knotts, Chief Justice William Rehnquist held that “A person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his movements from one place to another.”14  “The fact,” the Court con-
tinued, “that the officers in this case relied not only on visual surveillance, 
but also on the use of the beeper to signal the presence of [petitioner’s] auto-
mobile to the police receiver, does not alter the situation.  Nothing in the 
Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory fac-
ulties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and 
                                                        
 11.  For an explanation of the public observation doctrine, see GRAY, supra note 6, at 78–84.  
Among the important cases in which the Court has elaborated the public observation doctrine are 
Florida v. Riley, California v. Ciraolo, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, and United States v. 
Knotts.  Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–50 (1989) (holding that the police did not need a warrant 
to inspect a backyard from a helicopter because the airways are public); California v. Ciraolo, 476 
U.S. 207, 215 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (“We hold that 
the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a 
search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) 
(“A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his movements from one place to another.”).   
 12.  The idea that “search” is defined as a violation of a reasonable expectations of privacy that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable traces to a concurring opinion written by Justice John 
Marshall Harlan II in Katz v. United States.  389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  The 
Court subsequently adopted Justice Harlan’s definition of search as its own.  See GRAY, supra note 
6, at 76–78.  Of course, nobody without a law degree would define “search” in these terms.  Most 
folks would define “search” as inquiring, looking for, trying to find, seeking, etc.  Much of the 
current crisis in Fourth Amendment law can be traced to the Court’s decision to derogate from the 
common public meaning of “search.”  See GRAY, supra note 6, at 76–100, 158–60. 
 13.  460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 14.  Id. at 281. 
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technology afforded them in this case.”15  Given the close technological kin-
ship between the radio beeper used in Knotts and the GPS trackers used to 
monitor Maynard and Jones, the Jones trial court quite reasonably found that 
there was no “search,” that the officers were therefore not required to secure 
a warrant in order to install and use the GPS tracking devices, and that the 
officers’ failures to abide by the terms of their warrants did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.  Ebullient, prosecutors relied on the GPS evidence at 
trial and secured convictions against both Maynard and Jones.16 
Maynard and Jones appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit, where they prevailed.17  Writing for that 
court, Judge Douglas Ginsburg acknowledged the public observation doc-
trine, but held that it has limits, and could not sanction continuous, long-term 
surveillance “world without end.”18  Judge Ginsburg grounded that holding, 
in part, on what came to be known as the “mosaic theory.”19  The idea is 
simple and powerful.  The kinds of short term and otherwise limited surveil-
lance at issue in the cases that gave rise to the public observation doctrine 
reveal very little and correspond with the kinds of limited interactions we 
commonly have with other members of the public.  It is not uncommon, for 
example, to walk behind the same pedestrian for a few minutes or to follow 
the same car on the highway for an hour, but these happenstance interactions 
reveal very little about our fellow travelers. 
By contrast: 
 Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed 
by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, 
what he does not do, and what he does ensemble.  These types of 
information can each reveal more about a person than does any in-
dividual trip viewed in isolation.  Repeated visits to a church, a 
gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as 
does one’s not visiting any of these places over the course of a 
month.  The sequence of a person’s movements can reveal still 
more; a single trip to a gynecologist’s office tells little about a 
woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby 
supply store tells a different story.  A person who knows all of an-
other’s travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a 
                                                        
 15.  Id. at 282. 
 16.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403–04 (2012). 
 17.  United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 18.  Id. at 557. 
 19.  Id. at 562. For discussions of the mosaic theory, see David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, 
A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381, 381–82 (2013); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 (2012). 
      
70 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:66 
heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an out-
patient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular indi-
viduals or political groups—and not just one such fact about a per-
son, but all such facts. 
 . . . . 
 A reasonable person does not expect anyone to monitor and re-
tain a record of every time he drives his car, including his origin, 
route, destination, and each place he stops and how long he stays 
there; rather, he expects each of those movements to remain “dis-
connected and anonymous.”20 
Given its nature, duration, and extent, Judge Ginsburg held that the GPS 
tracking conducted against Maynard and Jones violated their reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy, constituted a Fourth Amendment “search,” and re-
quired a valid warrant.  The Government appealed to the Supreme Court.  
Along the way, Maynard negotiated a resolution in his case, leaving Jones 
alone before the Justices.21  Representing the Government, Deputy Solicitor 
General Michael Dreeben staked his argument on the public observation doc-
trine, prompting the following exchange with Chief Justice John Roberts: 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You think there would also not be a 
search if you put a GPS device on all of our cars, monitored our 
movements for a month? You think you’re entitled to do that under 
your theory? 
MR. DREEBEN: The Justices of this Court? 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes. (Laughter.) 
MR. DREEBEN: Under our theory and under this Court’s cases, 
the Justices of this Court when driving on public roadways have no 
greater expectation of . . . . 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So, your answer is yes, you could 
tomorrow decide that you put a GPS device on every one of our 
cars, follow us for a month; no problem under the Constitution?22 
At that point the argument was effectively over.  The result was clear.  
The Government had lost, impaled on the petard of absurdity.  All that re-
mained was the rationale.  Before turning to the Court’s reasoning, however, 
it is worth a moment’s pause to consider this exchange. 
                                                        
 20.  Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562–63 (footnote omitted) (quoting Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
255 N.E.2d 765, 772 (1970) (Breitel, J., concurring)). 
 21.  The procedural story here is interesting for those of us who find that sort of thing interest-
ing.  Among the points of particular interest is a dissenting opinion from the Circuit Court’s denial 
of the Government’s petition for rehearing en banc written by then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh.  In that 
prescient opinion, Judge Kavanaugh argued that GPS tracking is not a search, but that installing a 
GPS tracker on a private “effect” is a search insofar as it entails a physical intrusion into a constitu-
tionally protected area for investigative purposes.  United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769–71 
(2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  In advancing this position, Judge Kavanaugh predicted the ma-
jority opinion of the Court. 
 22.  Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (No. 10-1259). 
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The Chief Justice caught some flak for this line of questioning.  One 
point of concern was that his question indicated a bias in favor of law en-
forcement in Fourth Amendment cases unless the nature of the threat is such 
as to cause disquiet and insecurity among the Justices and their peers—in this 
case, wealthy, privileged, white men.23  When it comes to pretextual stops of 
young, black men and challenges against racially skewed stop and frisk pol-
icies, the Court is uninterested.24  But when it comes to police officers using 
heat detection devices to determine when “the lady of the house takes her 
daily sauna and bath”25 or ignoring the sensibilities of social callers,26 the 
Court leaps into action.  I would like to suggest a somewhat more charitable 
reading. 
As Chief Justice Roberts would recognize a couple of terms later, the 
Fourth Amendment is tied to founding-era concerns about general warrants 
and the threats they posed of broad and indiscriminate search.27  The very 
existence of general warrants threatened the security not just of those targeted 
for searches and seizures, but, indeed, the people as a whole.28  As I hear the 
Chief Justice in this exchange, he is giving voice to those collective interests 
by using himself and his colleagues as extreme examples.29  “If you can track 
us, then you can track anyone,” he might have said, “and if you can track 
anyone, anytime, all the time, for any reason or for no reason at all, then 
surely that violates the right of the people to be secure against threats of un-
reasonable search!”  Although that sense of concern for the collective dimen-
sions of Fourth Amendment rights did not decide the case in Jones,30 the 
Chief Justice tugged at an important thread—one that would become critical 
to understanding the role of the Fourth Amendment in addressing new and 
emerging surveillance technologies. 
The Chief Justice did not assign himself the majority opinion in Jones.  
That duty went instead to Justice Antonin Scalia who, writing for himself, 
                                                        
 23.  See, e.g., Tamara Rice Lave, Protecting Elites: An Alternative Take on How United States 
v. Jones Fits into the Court’s Technology Jurisprudence, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 461, 461, 484–86 
(2013). 
 24.  See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (declining to consider the subjective 
intentions of police officers, including potential racial bias, when evaluating the constitutionality of 
stops). 
 25.  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001) (holding that the use of heat detection de-
vices to monitor the interior of constitutionally protected areas is a “search”). 
 26.  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (holding that police should respect the 
rules of genteel social decorum by not entering a home when one resident has consented to a search 
but the other has refused to consent). 
 27.  See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014). 
 28.  GRAY, supra note 6, at 69–71, 154. 
 29.  Id. at 114–15. 
 30.  The Court ultimately held that the physical intrusion entailed in installing the GPS device 
on Jones’s car was a “search.”  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (“The Govern-
ment physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.  We have no 
doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”). 
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Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and 
Sonia Sotomayor, held that the physical intrusion upon Jones’s “effect”—his 
vehicle—for purposes of gathering information was a “search” subject to 
Fourth Amendment regulation.31  That holding was moderately exciting be-
cause it revitalized a thread of Fourth Amendment law all but abandoned 
since the Court’s 1967 decision in Katz v. United States,32 which famously 
defined “searches” as violations of subjectively manifested expectations of 
privacy that society is willing to recognize as “reasonable.”33  But the truly 
thrilling action came in concurring opinions written by Justices Sonia So-
tomayor and Samuel Alito. 
Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, but wrote 
separately to highlight her concerns with the exploitation of tracking technol-
ogies embedded in a range of consumer goods, including cars and 
smartphones.34  As Justice Sotomayor noted, surveillance conducted through 
these devices might provide a “comprehensive record of a person’s public 
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, pro-
fessional, religious, and sexual associations.”35  Moreover, the “government 
can store such records and efficiently mine them for information years into 
the future.”36  “And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to con-
ventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it 
evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: 
‘limited police resources and community hostility.’”37  Given these features, 
Justice Sotomayor worried that granting government agents unfettered access 
to the location information produced by these devices would “chill[] associ-
ational and expressive freedoms” and “alter the relationship between citizen 
and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.”38  In recog-
nition of the fact that third parties routinely have access to some or all of this 
location data, Justice Sotomayor concluded that “it may be necessary to re-
consider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties,”39 thereby fore-
shadowing changes in not only the public observation doctrine, but the third 
party doctrine as well.40 
                                                        
 31.  Id.  
 32.  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 33.  The two-pronged reasonable expectation of privacy test is found not in the majority deci-
sion but in Justice John Marshall Harlan II’s concurring opinion.  See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). 
 34.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 35.  Id. at 415.  
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. at 415–16 (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)). 
 38.  Id. at 416 (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(Flaum, J., concurring)).  
 39.  Id. at 417. 
 40.  The third party doctrine holds that if a citizen shares information with a third party, then 
they have no Fourth Amendment complaint if that third party subsequently shares that information 
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There is a lot to think about in Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence, 
but for present purposes I would like to emphasize two critical features.  First, 
she picks up the thread of Chief Justice Roberts’s question at oral argument, 
making clear that Jones was not the primary party of interest in the case.41  
Rather, the main stakeholders were all of us.  That concern for the collective 
interests of “the people” is evident in the picture she paints of pervasive sur-
veillance, the creation of what Professor Stephen Henderson has called 
“Fourth Amendment time machines,”42 and the effects of those threats on 
associational freedoms and our democratic order.  Second, she explicitly con-
nects Fourth Amendment interests with fundamental political freedoms and 
the proper relationship between the government and the governed in a dem-
ocratic society.  By failing to protect against threats of broad, indiscriminate, 
and intrusive surveillance, she contends, the Court would leave unprotected 
the core First Amendment rights of “the people” while allowing totalitarian-
ism to enter through the backdoor.  Fundamental to functioning democracy 
is the role of the people as disciplinary observers of their government.  In 
democracies, the people watch the government.  By contrast, a defining fea-
ture of totalitarian states is that the state is a disciplinary observer of the peo-
ple.  In totalitarian regimes, the government watches the people.  Granting 
broad, unfettered discretion for executive agents to use surveillance technol-
ogies would, Justice Sotomayor suggests, grant them authoritarian powers 
characteristic of a totalitarian state. 
Justice Samuel Alito also wrote an important concurring opinion in 
Jones.43  Writing for himself and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen 
Breyer, and Elena Kagan, Justice Alito expressed surprise and concern with 
the majority’s return to physical intrusion as a Fourth Amendment trigger.  
As he read Katz and its progeny, the Court had long abandoned the link be-
tween search and trespass in favor of assessing reasonable expectations of 
privacy.  Why wake the dead?  In addition, he worried about the inability of 
a physical intrusion test to deal with the challenges posed by new and emerg-
ing surveillance technologies, many of which do not require anything like a 
trespass.  He therefore favored an interpretation of reasonable expectations 
of privacy that would take into account the duration of the surveillance or, 
perhaps, the quantum of information gathered.  Specifically, he would have 
                                                        
with the government.  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–42 (1979) (holding that people 
willingly supply the numbers they dial to the phone company and thus have no expectation of pri-
vacy over those numbers); Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 54 (1974) (holding that a 
bank did not violate the Fourth Amendment when it gave a depositor’s records to the government); 
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (holding that when a wrongdoer’s accomplice 
records or transmits a conversation for authorities, no Fourth Amendment right has been violated); 
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).   
 41.  See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
 42.  Stephen Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines (and What They Might Say About 
Police Body Cameras), 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 933, 937 (2016). 
 43.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring). 
      
74 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:66 
held that “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses im-
pinges on expectations of privacy.”44 
II.  WHAT TO MAKE OF JONES? 
There was a bit of a feeding frenzy among law professors and other 
commentators in the wake of Jones.  Some were deeply critical.45  Some were 
elated.46  But everyone was left to wonder where the Court would go next, 
and why.  Jones made clear that at least five Justices were ready to rethink 
some of the Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine, but there were few clues as 
to what those changes might be or the constitutional theory that would sup-
port them.  As law professors are wont to do, we took this as an invitation of 
sorts.  The Justices were seeking our advice.  We responded.  Some tried to 
operationalize Justice Alito’s durational approach.47  Some focused instead 
on the nature of the information gathered48 or its source.49  Others suggested 
that what mattered was how much information or data was gathered and the 
“mosaics” revealed.50  Dissatisfied with all of these options, Professor Dan-
ielle Citron and I argued that courts should focus on the new technologies 
themselves, recognizing that the Fourth Amendment regulates the deploy-
ment and use of means and methods capable of facilitating programs of broad 
and indiscriminate surveillance.51  Then, we all waited to see what would 
come next. 
                                                        
 44.  Id. at 430. 
 45.  See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 19. 
 46.  See, e.g., Erin Murphy, Back to the Future: The Curious Case of United States v. Jones, 10 
OHIO J. CRIM. L. 325 (2012). 
 47.  See Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance 
Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 16–
28 (2012) (creating a series of brightline durational thresholds dictating when law enforcement of-
ficers would need court approval to conduct surveillance). 
 48.  See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO 
THIRD PARTY RECORDS 25-4.1(a) commentary (3d ed. 2013) (explaining, for example, that medical 
records are “highly private,” which means that law enforcement would need a judicial warrant to 
access them but call records are only minimally or moderately private, so would require only official 
approval by a command official or a subpoena); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1937–41 (2013). 
 49.  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1185–94 (2016); Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 616–37 (2015). 
 50.  For a discussion of the mosaic approach and its promoters, see Gray & Citron, supra note 
19, at 408. 
 51.  Gray & Citron, supra note 3, at 82. 
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III.  EMERGING CONCERNS ABOUT COLLECTIVE RIGHTS: RILEY V. 
CALIFORNIA 
As the academic debate about Jones raged, the Court decided Riley v. 
California.52  The question presented in that case was whether the search in-
cident to arrest rule applied to cellular phones.  The search incident to arrest 
rule allows officers effecting a lawful arrest to conduct a warrantless search 
of an arrestee and areas and effects within his immediate reach and control at 
the time of arrest.53  Officers routinely rely on this rule to justify searches of 
pockets, wallets, backpacks, and purses.  But should that same rule allow 
officers to search a cellular phone incident to arrest and without a warrant?  
A unanimous Court held that it does not.  But why?  The answer is intriguing. 
Writing for everyone except Justice Alito—who concurred—Chief Jus-
tice Roberts framed the question this way: “These cases require us to decide 
how the search incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell phones, 
which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the pro-
verbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of 
human anatomy.”54  In the next few sentences he then explained that these 
new technologies—cellular smartphones—have emerged from the “incon-
ceivable” to become something “a significant majority of American adults 
now own.”55  The clear signal was that the Court was concerned not just with 
Mr. Riley and similarly situated arrestees, but with all of us whose interests 
were at stake due to the sheer pervasiveness of the technology.  But it was 
not just the “pervasiveness” of the technology that concerned the Court.  It 
was equally concerned about the nature of the technology and our relation-
ship to it. 
Unlike wallets, bags, and notebooks—mere “physical objects” that can 
contain modestly finite amounts of information—smart phones “place vast 
quantities of personal information literally in the hands of individuals.”56  To 
compare the search of wallets and bags to cellular phones, the Court contin-
ued, is a bit “like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable 
from a flight to the moon.  Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, 
but little else justifies lumping them together.”57  In both quantitative and 
qualitative dimensions, smart phones are just different.  They have “immense 
                                                        
 52.  573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 53.  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (holding that subsequent to a lawful arrest 
in arrestee’s home, police may search arrestee and areas accessible to him in the room where he was 
arrested, but may not search the rest of the house without a warrant or other justification); United 
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1950) (finding the search of arrestee and areas within his 
reach at the time of his arrest in his office, including desk and filing cabinets, was reasonable and 
did not require a warrant). 
 54.  Riley, 573 U.S at 385.  
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 386. 
 57.  Id. at 393. 
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storage capacity,” capable of storing “millions of pages of text, thousands of 
pictures, [and] hundreds of videos,” not to mention emails, contacts, and his-
torical location data.58  They are also conduits to even more data stored in 
third-party servers.59  Beyond the amount and diversity of data stored in or 
directly accessible through cellular smartphones, the nature of that data raises 
serious privacy concerns.  That is because the kinds of data gathered, stored, 
and accessed through smartphones is uniquely intimate—think Jeff Be-
zos60—and also capable of painting a detailed account of a user’s life going 
back months and even years.61  Citing Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opin-
ion in Jones, the Riley majority worried that information stored on 
smartphones can reveal movements, associations, health information, and 
more—concerns that affect each of us and all of us.62 
 In the Chief Justice’s Riley opinion, we can see emerging the key fea-
tures of the Court’s evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: First, the 
Court puts the collective interest of the people front and center.  What drives 
the opinion is the ubiquity of cellular phones, the central role they have come 
to play in daily life, and the intimate nature of our relationships with these 
devices.  To fail to afford phones the very highest levels of Fourth Amend-
ment protection would, the Court implies, leave each of us and all of us inse-
cure against threats of unreasonable searches in the same way that general 
warrants and writs of assistance threatened the security of the founding gen-
eration.63   
 And keep in mind the government’s position in Riley.  Law enforcement 
was not arguing that smartphones do not enjoy Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.  To the contrary, it conceded that point.  All the government wanted was 
to have smartphones treated the same way as briefcases, purses, and other 
portable “effects” commonly seized during lawful arrests.  But the Court—
unanimously—rejected that not unreasonable position, granting cellular 
phones the same Fourth Amendment status as homes. 
Second, the Court adopted a technology-centered approach when ana-
lyzing the Fourth Amendment question presented in Riley.  Although the 
technology at issue was the object of the search rather than the means and 
method of conducting the search, the Court’s focus on technology and the 
                                                        
 58.  Id. at 393–94.   
 59.  Id. at 397. 
 60.  Jim Rutenberg & Karen Weise, Jeff Bezos Accuses National Enquirer of “Extortion and 
Blackmail,” N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/technology/jeff-be-
zos-sanchez-enquirer.html.  A national paper obtained intimate pictures Mr. Bezos took of himself, 
which he sent to his mistress.  Those pictures were stored on his phone and hers as well as in cloud 
back-up servers to which their phones were linked.  Id. 
 61.  Riley, 573 U.S. at 393–94. 
 62.  Id. at 396.  
 63.  Id. at 403. 
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dimensions and extent of the threat posed to Fourth Amendment interests in 
relation to the technology foreshadowed what was to come in Carpenter.64 
IV.  CARPENTER, SEARCH, AND STANDING: COLLECTIVE RIGHTS IN THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Broadly, the issue in Carpenter was whether government agents need a 
warrant to access the cell site location information (“CSLI”) gathered and 
stored by cellular service providers.65  CSLI is generated as cellular phones 
maintain regular contact with provider networks.66  Cellular companies rou-
tinely store this data.  This means that those private companies have substan-
tial and detailed records of users’ movements going back months or years.  
But what was the constitutional question?  As in many cases that come before 
the Court, framing matters. 
Echoing his question at oral argument in Jones and his majority opinion 
in Riley, Chief Justice Roberts starts his majority opinion in Carpenter by 
highlighting the collective interests at stake.  “There are 396 million cell 
phone service accounts in the United States,” we are told in the opening sen-
tences, “for a Nation of 326 million people.”67  Not only does almost every-
one have a cellular phone, but we also carry them with us everywhere all the 
time.68  Why does this matter?  Well, because the Fourth Amendment, Chief 
Justice Roberts reminds us, was framed in response to concerns about general 
warrants, writs of assistance, and the unfettered discretion they gave execu-
tive agents to search and seize.69  Cast against this historical backdrop, the 
Chief Justice explains, the Fourth Amendment is best understood as a pro-
scription against “arbitrary power” and “too permeating police surveil-
lance.”70  As the Chief Justice notes, the Court has highlighted these collec-
tive interests in its recent cases dealing with new and emerging surveillance 
technologies.  As an example, he cites the Court’s opinion in Kyllo v. United 
States.71 
                                                        
 64.  Not to mention endorsing precisely the approach Professor Danielle Citron and I prescribed 
in a series of articles published in the months after Jones.  See David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, 
Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 262, 269–74 (2013); Gray & Citron, supra note 19, at 385–89; David Gray et al., Fighting Cy-
bercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745, 765–70 (2013); David 
C. Gray, The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records: 
Critical Perspectives from a Technology-Centered Approach to Quantitative Privacy, 66 OKLA. L. 
REV. 919, 921–27 (2014). 
 65.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211, 2217, 2220–21, 2223 (2018). 
 66.  Id. at 2211. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 2218. 
 69.  Id. at 2213; see also GRAY, supra note 6, at 160–65. 
 70.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (first quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 
(1886); and then quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)); see also GRAY, supra 
note 6, at 264–75. 
 71.  533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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Kyllo dealt with the use of thermal imaging devices to gather evidence 
about the interior of homes, and particularly hot-spots associated with the use 
of high-powered lamps used to grow marijuana indoors.72  On Chief Justice 
Roberts’s telling, Kyllo, brought the use of thermal imaging devices under 
Fourth Amendment regulation “[b]ecause any other conclusion would leave 
homeowners ‘at the mercy of advancing technology.’”73  The Carpenter 
Court identified the same dangers in granting law enforcement unfettered ac-
cess to CSLI.  “[B]ecause location information is continually logged for all 
of the 400 million devices in the United States—not just those belonging to 
persons who might happen to come under investigation,” the Chief Justice 
writes, “this newfound tracking capacity runs against everyone.”74  Moreo-
ver, as the Court points out, because CSLI is gathered continuously and 
stored for years, “police need not even know in advance whether they want 
to follow a particular individual, or when.”75  “Whoever the suspect turns out 
to be,” the Court continues, “he has effectively been tailed every moment of 
every day for five years, and the police may—in the Government’s view—
call upon the results of that surveillance without regard to the constraints of 
the Fourth Amendment.”76  As a consequence, “[o]nly the few without cell 
phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.”77 
Although the Court is obviously feeling its way in Carpenter, it is 
clearly focused on collective effects—in this case how CSLI can facilitate 
invasive, pervasive, broad, and indiscriminate searches.  In adopting this ap-
proach, the Court makes explicit what was implicit in the Chief Justice’s 
question at oral argument in Jones: that the Justices are concerned about the 
collective impact of granting government agents unfettered access and broad 
discretion to deploy and use modern surveillance technologies.78  Granting 
such a license would allow “too permeating police surveillance,” leaving 
each of us and all of us insecure against threats of indiscriminate surveillance 
in ways similar to the threats posed by general warrants and writs of assis-
tance.79 
So, going back to the beginning of this Essay, how does all of this help 
the Court answer those two questions: “What, precisely, is the government 
                                                        
 72.  Id. at 29.  
 73.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35); see also GRAY, supra note 
6, at 125. 
 74.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218; see also GRAY, supra note 6, at 252–54. 
 75.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
 76.  Id.; see also GRAY, supra note 6, at 270–71. 
 77.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
 78.  See GRAY, supra note 6, at 253. 
 79.  Citron & Gray, supra note 3, at 70 n.46 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 
(1948)); see also id. at 85, 92, 95–99, 101, 144 (“In our view, the threshold Fourth Amendment 
question raised by quantitative privacy concerns is whether an investigative technique or technology 
has the capacity to facilitate broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance that raise the specter of 
a surveillance state if deployment and use of that technology is left to the unfettered discretion of 
government.”). 
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action that constitutes a ‘search’ when law enforcement requests business 
records from a service provider?”80 and “How, exactly, do customers have 
Fourth Amendment ‘standing’ to challenge those requests?”81  The answer to 
the first question—what was the “search”—is easy.  Government agents in 
Carpenter were inquiring, seeking, and trying to find where Carpenter was 
by examining and looking through the documents and data provided by his 
cellular service provider.82  This is conduct that any competent English 
speaker would identify as a “search.”83  That includes our eighteenth century 
forebears.84  The fact that the agents were looking for Carpenter on public 
streets does not make their conduct any less a “search.”  The fact that one can 
search in many places, inside and outside, in private homes and on public 
streets, is in keeping with common law usage going back to, at least, 1658.85  
Moreover, as the Court recognized more recently, officers might “search the 
wood for a thief.”86  So, of course the agents in Carpenter were conducting a 
search.  The important question for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is 
whether granting government agents unfettered discretion to conduct 
searches using CSLI threatens “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.”87  As the Fourth Amendment commands, this is a right that “shall not 
                                                        
 80.  Gray & Citron, supra note 3, at 133–37.   
 81.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2227 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2241–42 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting). 
 82.  GRAY, supra note 6, at 251–52. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 n.1 (2001) (“When the Fourth Amendment was 
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Night-time” (alteration in original)); WILLIAM SHEPPARD, THE OFFICES OF CONSTABLES, 
CHURCH-WARDENS, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR, SUPRAVISORS OF THE HIGH-WAYES, TREASURERS 
OF THE COUNTY-STOCK; AND SOME OTHER LESSER COUNTRY OFFICERS, PLAINLY AND LIVELY 
SET FORTH Chp. 8, § 2 (London 1658) (“[T]his Officer receiving a Hue and Cry after a Fellon, 
must, with all speed, make diligent pursuit, with Horse and Foot, after the offendors from Town to 
Town the way it is sent, and make diligent search in his own Town.”); THE CONDUCTOR 
GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 197–98 (Phila. 
1801) (noting the authority of a constable or sheriff to “search in his town for suspected persons” 
and advising that “it is a good course to have the warrant of a justice of the peace when time will 
permit, in order to prevent causeless hue and cry”). 
 86.  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32 n.1 (quoting N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 66 (6th ed. 1989) (1828)).  
 87.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see GRAY, supra note 6, at 251–52.  
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be violated,”88 an imperative that can only be fulfilled by imposing prior re-
straints.89  With these concerns front and center, the Court held that affording 
law enforcement broad discretion to search using CSLI would leave each of 
us and all of us—“the people”—vulnerable to intrusive, pervasive, and indis-
criminate surveillance—just the sort of insecurity posed by the general war-
rants that inspired ratification of the Fourth Amendment in 1791.90 
The answer to the second question—how can Carpenter have Fourth 
Amendment “standing” to challenge the search of business records kept by 
his cellular service provider—is also easy: it is the wrong question to ask.  
Or, at the very least, it is a question based on one or more false premises.  
Take, as examples, the dissenting opinions of Justice Anthony Kennedy and 
Justice Clarence Thomas in Carpenter.  According to Justice Kennedy: 
“Fourth Amendment rights . . . are personal.  The Amendment protects ‘[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their . . . persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects’—not the persons, houses, papers, and effects of others.”91 
Reprising this same theme,92 Justice Thomas contends, 
The Fourth Amendment specifies that the people have a right to be 
secure from unreasonable searches of “their” persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects.  Although phrased in the plural, “[t]he obvious 
meaning of [‘their’] is that each person has the right to be secure 
against unreasonable searches and seizures in his own person, 
house, papers, and effects.” . . . . Stated differently, the word 
“their” means, at the very least, that individuals do not have Fourth 
Amendment rights in someone else’s property.93 
In other words, the text does not mean what it says, it means the opposite of 
what it says.94 
It is this silly bit of anti-textualism that is the source of the problem.  As 
folks like Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas see matters, the Fourth 
Amendment is a constitutional specification of one of the sticks in the bundle 
                                                        
 88.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 89.  GRAY, supra note 6, at 166–69. 
 90.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2017). 
 91.  Id. at 2227 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 92.  Because the more something is said, the truer it becomes. 
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of property rights: the right to exclude.95  Another, alienation, comes along 
(twice!) in the Fifth Amendment.96  There is a certain Lockean quality to this.  
After all, John Locke famously claimed that we have a natural right in our-
selves, in the surpluses and improvements that result from our labor, and that 
a condition of justice in the social contract is the legal recognition of that 
right.97  But the Bill of Rights is about much more than property rights.  It is 
also concerned with political rights: the right to assemble and petition the 
government,98 the preservation of unenumerated rights to the people,99 and 
the reservation of undelegated rights to the people.100  And this too is very 
Lockean.  Locke imagined not one contract but two leading to the formation 
of just states.101  First, individuals exit the state of nature by entering into a 
social contract forming a nation or a people.102  Second, that people enters a 
political contract with its government.103  And who, by the very terms of the 
United States Constitution, enters into a political contract to form a more per-
fect union, etc.?  “We, the individual persons residing in the United States?”  
Of course not.  It is, instead, “We, the People of the United States” who en-
tered into the contract of political government described thereafter.104 
So, the Fourth Amendment means what it says.  It guarantees a right “of 
the people.”  Not a right “of persons.”  If James Madison and his colleagues 
in the First Congress meant for the Fourth Amendment to guarantee rights 
“of persons,” then they would have written it that way.  They certainly had a 
ready model in Article Fourteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 
                                                        
 95.  Because the Third Amendment was not enough to make the point.  See U.S. CONST. amend. 
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 102.  GRAY, supra note 6, at 144–46. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  U.S. CONST. pmbl.   
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which provides that “[e]very subject has a right to be secure from all unrea-
sonable searches, and seizures.”105  And they demonstrably knew how to as-
sign rights to individuals when they wanted to, as they did in the Fifth106 and 
Sixth Amendments.107  But they chose to assign Fourth Amendment rights to 
“the people,” which can only be read as a reference to “the people,” perhaps 
aspirationally, cited in the Preamble.108  Read in this light, the Fourth Amend-
ment is not a defense of individual property rights.  It is, instead, a restraint 
on government power—a restraint designed to preserve the independence 
and integrity of the people as a whole.109  It is a bulwark against tyranny.110 
The collective nature of the Fourth Amendment is even more evident 
when we consider the precise nature of the right it enshrines.  The Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit searches and seizures.  It does not even pro-
hibit unreasonable searches and seizures.  Instead, it guarantees a right “to be 
secure” against unreasonable searches and seizures.  It commands that “the 
people” shall live in a state free from fear of being the targets of unreasonable 
searches and seizures—and particularly searches and seizures wielded as 
tools to punish disfavored political and religious groups.111  Viewed from this 
perspective, the Fourth Amendment is not particularly concerned with indi-
vidual searches and seizures as such, or rights violations suffered by individ-
ual victims of those searches.112  After all, those individuals can vindicate 
their own rights through civil actions.113  The Fourth Amendment is instead 
concerned with the general threat to the people arising from claims of gov-
ernment power inherent in those individual events—the maxims of tyranny 
expressed in those actions.114  As Lord Camden put the point in Huckle v. 
Money115 (one of the “General Warrants” cases identified by Justice Thomas 
                                                        
 105.  MASS. CONST. art. XIV.  This provision of the Massachusetts Constitution was first 
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in Carpenter as reflecting what “the founding generation considered ‘the true 
and ultimate expression of constitutional law’”)116: 
[T]he small injury done to the plaintiff, or the inconsiderableness 
of his station and rank in life did not appear to the jury in that strik-
ing light in which the great point of law touching the liberty of the 
subject appeared to them at the trial; they saw a magistrate over all 
the King’s subjects, exercising arbitrary power, violating Magna 
Charta, and attempting to destroy the liberty of the kingdom . . . .117 
The security of the people is threatened whenever anyone, no matter 
“his station,” is the target of an unreasonable search or seizure.  The Fourth 
Amendment explicitly recognizes the collective interests at stake in these par-
ticular events and commands the enforcement of measures sufficient to guar-
antee our collective security.118 
With these minor clarifications in mind, let us revisit the majority opin-
ion in Carpenter that Justices Kennedy and Thomas attack.  Early on, the 
Court identifies two “basic guideposts” drawn from “historical understand-
ings” of the Fourth Amendment.119  “First, that the Amendment seeks to se-
cure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’”120  Second, “a central 
aim of the Framers was ‘to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating 
police surveillance.’”121  As is outlined above, the Court then goes on to ex-
plain how collective interests in securing privacy and guarding against threats 
of pervasive surveillance have guided the Court’s treatment of contemporary 
                                                        
 116.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2239 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 
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 121.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
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surveillance technologies.  For example, in Kyllo its required government 
agents to secure warrants before using thermal imagers to detect infrared ra-
diation emanating from homes “[b]ecause any other conclusion would leave 
homeowners ‘at the mercy of advancing technology.’”122  Similarly, in Riley 
the Court required that officers obtain a warrant before searching the data on 
cellular phones because the devices are ubiquitous, having become virtual 
fifth appendages for most Americans, and in light of “the vast store of sensi-
tive information” they contain.123  To hold otherwise, the Court noted in Ri-
ley, would be to ignore the pervasive threat posed to the ninety percent of 
American adults who own cellular phones if those phones were open to police 
scrutiny “on a routine basis,”124 a result, the Court suggested, that would be 
akin to granting general warrants and writs of assistance, the opposition to 
which was “one of the driving forces behind the Revolution itself.”125 
As the Carpenter Court recognized, allowing government agents unfet-
tered access to CSLI implicates general, collective interests that are protected 
by the Fourth Amendment.  Cellular phones are ubiquitous, to the point that 
there are more cellular service accounts with United States carriers than there 
are people.126  Moreover, most people “compulsively carry cell phones with 
them all the time . . . beyond public thoroughfares and into private resi-
dences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially reveal-
ing locales.”127  This means that granting unfettered government access to 
CSLI can facilitate programs of “near perfect surveillance, as if [the govern-
ment] had attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s user.”128  Of course we 
are all already wearing those ankle monitors all the time.  As a consequence, 
[P]olice need not even know in advance whether they want to fol-
low a particular individual, or when. 
 Whoever the suspect turns out to be, he has effectively been 
tailed every moment of every day for five years, and the police 
may—in the Government’s view—call upon the results of that sur-
veillance without regard to the constraints of the Fourth Amend-
ment.  Only the few without cell phones could escape this tireless 
and absolute surveillance.129 
What this shows is that the majority in Carpenter was keenly aware that 
the real party in interest in the case was “the people” as a whole.  What was 
at stake was “the tracking of not only Carpenter’s location but also everyone 
                                                        
 122.  Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001)). 
 123.  Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014)). 
 124.  Riley, 573 U.S. at 395. 
 125.  Id. at 403. 
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in the United States—for a Nation of 326 million people”). 
 127.  Id. at 2218. 
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else’s, not for a short period but for years and years.”130  Failing to impose 
Fourth Amendment restraints on government access to CSLI would therefore 
leave the people insecure against threats of broad and indiscriminate surveil-
lance—exactly the kind of “permeating police surveillance” the Fourth 
Amendment was designed to prevent.131 
Now, at last, we can understand how badly Justices Kennedy and 
Thomas missed the mark when they accused the Court of indulging collective 
rights to grant Carpenter “standing” to assert a property interest in his service 
provider’s papers.  The Court did indeed rely on the fundamentally collective 
nature of Fourth Amendment rights when deciding to regulate government 
access to CSLI, but it did not do so in order to expand the doctrine of Fourth 
Amendment “standing.”  Instead, it took note of the collective interests at 
stake in searches of CSLI to determine whether these kinds of searches fall 
within the regulatory compass of the Fourth Amendment.  The quite reason-
able question the Court asked was whether granting government agents un-
fettered access to this particular means of conducting searches would com-
promise the security of the people against unreasonable searches by 
facilitating programs of broad and indiscriminate search.132  In answer to that 
question, the Court held that “[i]n light of the deeply revealing nature of 
CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and 
automatic nature of its collection,” it must “decline to grant the state unre-
stricted access to a wireless carrier’s database of physical location infor-
mation.”133  It instead imposed a warrant requirement, which is the Fourth 
Amendment’s preferred prospective remedy, and one that is particularly 
well-suited to the regulation of tracking technologies, in part because they 
are most likely to be used in the context of discrete investigations.134 
V.  COLLECTIVE RIGHTS AND THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH 
GOING FORWARD 
The academic debate about Carpenter is well under way with scholars 
and critics trying to understand what the Court did, why, and where it is likely 
to go from here.  This Essay has attempted to answer the “what” and “why” 
question.  In essence, the Court held that “the threshold Fourth Amendment 
question . . . is whether an investigative technique or technology has the ca-
pacity to facilitate broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance that raise 
the specter of a surveillance state if deployment and use of that technology is 
                                                        
 130.  Id. at 2219. 
 131.  Id. at 2214 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
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left to the unfettered discretion of government.”135  It grounded this rule in 
the Fourth Amendment right “of the people to be secure . . . against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures,”136 rightly emphasizing the collective dimen-
sions of that right.  So where do we go from here? 
I expect that we will see a steady stream of challenges targeting new and 
emerging search methods and surveillance technologies.  As these cases 
come to the Court, the Justices are likely to ask questions about the intrusive-
ness of the searches these technologies facilitate, the scalability of the tech-
nology, and the costs associated with its deployment and use.137  Applying 
these and other factors, the Court will find that there is no threat associated 
with allowing law enforcement officers full discretion to use traditional 
means and methods such as human surveillance and radio beepers.  The Court 
is also likely to find that some technologies must be subject to Fourth Amend-
ment regulation.  Here, I think it is quite likely that the Court will impose 
constitutional restraints on RFID tracking, cell site simulators, tower dumps, 
drones, Big Data, and efforts to access data stored on third party servers (the 
“Cloud”).138  What will be more interesting is the form of those restraints. 
To date, the Court has endorsed only one prospective remedy in Fourth 
Amendment cases: the warrant requirement.  But there is nothing in the text 
or history of the Fourth Amendment to support the proposition that probable 
cause warrants are the only way to guarantee the security of the people 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.139  The Government had an op-
portunity on this front in Carpenter.  Rather than staking its position on the 
claim that CSLI tracking is not a “search,” the Government might have con-
ceded that it is a search, but could have then maintained that Section 2703 of 
the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”)140 is sufficient to guarantee that the 
government is not tracking most people, most of the time, through their cel-
lular phones.  Although Section 2703(d) orders do not require probable cause, 
and certainly do not have a particularity requirement, the Government could 
have argued that the 2703 framework reflects a considered legislative view 
and strikes a reasonable balance among the interests at stake, guarding 
against “unreasonable” searches.  The Court may well have been skeptical, 
but this would certainly have been an interesting argument.  But the door is 
far from closed.  At least since Jones, the Court has been very interested in 
legislative and executive solutions to the privacy and security challenges 
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posed by new and emerging technologies.141  That interest remains.  I suspect 
that the Court would be favorably disposed to more bespoke arrangements 
than a warrant requirement.142  So what will happen next?  The ball, it seems 
to me, is in the court of the political branches. 
                                                        
 141.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
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